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ARGUMENT 
A. CBI IS NOT A REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR 
The Audit Division asserts that CBI is a real property 
contractor, and, therefore, is liable for sales tax on its 
purchases of materials. (Respondent's brief at page 11.) 
However, the uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing 
showed that CBI's only activities at its Salt Lake facility, and 
the only activities which the Audit Division seeks to tax, or has 
the power to tax, consisted exclusively of manufacturing. The 
uncontroverted facts are: 
1. CBI is a manufacturer of large all-welded steel 
plate water storage tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks, 
low-temperature pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water 
treatment equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large 
metal structures primarily for storing, processing, mixing or 
blending of materials. (Transcript at pages 21-29.) 
2. The Salt Lake facility was built exclusively for 
manufacturing steel plate into such tanks, spherical pressure 
vessels, containers, and other products. (Transcript at pages 
16-17.) 
3. The equipment housed at the Salt Lake facility was 
designed and used exclusively for manufacturing steel plate into 
such tanks, spherical pressure vessels, storage containers, and 
other products. (Transcript at page 17.) 
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4. Neither the Salt Lake facility and the equipment 
located in it, nor the personnel at the Salt Lake facility, were 
ever used to affix to real property CBI's manufactured tanks, 
either within Utah or outside of Utah. (Transcript at pages 30-
31, 37, 46-47.) 
5. The functions performed at the Salt Lake facility, 
and the only activities of CBI which the Audit division seeks to 
tax, consisted solely of manufacturing large steel plate water 
storage tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks, low-
temperature pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water 
treatment equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large 
metal structures, and, during the period in question, decking for 
the Golden Gate Bridge. (Transcript at pages 21-22.) 
6. But for the practical constraints of transporting 
such large tanks and other CBI products, CBI would have assembled 
and shipped them in completed form to their final destinations. 
(Transcript at pages 10, 23-24, 40.) 
7. On occasion, tanks and other CBI products that 
have been assembled at a customer's site are later disassembled, 
transported to another location, and reassembled, although never 
by CBI personnel from the Salt Lake facility. (Transcript at 
page 45.) 
The Audit Division presented no evidence at the hearing 
that CBI's activities at its Salt Lake facility consisted of 
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anything but manufacturing tanks, spherical pressure vessels, 
containers, and other personal property. 
The order of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Tax 
Commission") ignores the plain evidence of the nature of CBI's 
business activity - CBI manufactures very large items of personal 
property. With respect to the tanks, pressure vessels and other 
containers, they have a top, a bottom and sides. The fact that 
these very large items of personal property are generally 
assembled at the customer's site does not change their nature or 
function, nor does it change the nature of the manufacturing 
activities that took place in Utah. CBI does not build houses, 
or offices, or buildings of any sort whatsoever. 
The Audit Division cites a Michigan appellate court 
case, Miedema Metal Building Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury, 
338 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), and a California district 
court case, Levine v. State Bd. of Equalization, 299 P.2d 738 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956), to support its assertion that CBI is 
a real property contractor. Neither case is on point. 
The Miedema case involved intrastate taxation of a 
company which sold and constructed grain storage bins entirely 
within the State of Michigan. The taxpayer did not manufacture 
the grain storage bins it sold; it merely sold and erected them. 
The issue in the case was not whether the taxpayer was a real 
property contractor; and there was no finding that the taxpayer 
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was a real property contractor. Nor was the issue whether the 
storage bins constituted real or personal property. In fact, for 
purposes of the statute at issue, the court presumed that the 
grain bins were, in fact, personal property. 
The issue in the case was whether the bins were exempt 
from Michigan sales and use taxes under a Michigan statute that 
provided a complete exemption for personal property that 
comprised part of an agricultural processing system. In holding 
that the sale of the bins should not escape taxation, the 
Michigan court relied exclusively on the language of the statute 
itself. The statute specifically denied the exemption to 
"tangible personal property 'permanently affixed and becoming a 
structural part of real estate'." 338 N.W. 2d 926. Finding that 
the personal property was "permanently affixed" to real estate, 
the court denied the exemption. 
Reference to the California district court case, Levine 
v. State Board of Equalization. is also wholly unproductive. The 
Levine case is a decision of a California district court on facts 
completely unrelated to the facts at issue in this case. More 
important, there is no need to consult a California district 
court case on unrelated facts where the California Supreme Court 
has already specifically held that based upon the very facts at 
issue in this case, CBI is a manufacturer. According to the 
California Supreme Court, "Plaintiff, Chicago Bridge & Iron, is 
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primarily a manufacturer of tanks." Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. 
Johnson, 19 Cal.2d 162, 163, 119, P.2d 945, 946 (1941). See 
CBI's Brief of Appellant at pages 12-14. CBI's business has not 
changed since 1941. 
The Audit Division's assertion that CBI is a real 
property contractor depends entirely upon the extraterritorial 
event of assembly of its products. However, the Audit Division 
concedes that CBI cannot be taxed on sales of tanks or other 
personal property where the passage of title and delivery occurs 
outside of Utah.1 (Transcript at page 69.) There is simply no 
basis under the law for using events that take place after the 
purchase of raw materials upon which CBI is required by 
California law to self-assess use tax, and which events take 
place outside Utah, to justify the taxation by Utah of the 
purchase of the raw materials. 
Notwithstanding what is clearly extraterritorial, 
unconstitutional taxation, the Audit Division's assessed deficiency 
includes tax on sales of personal property by CBI to California 
customers where the terms of such sales are "F.O.B. destination". 
The Audit Division has refused to reduce the assessed deficiency of 
CBI for such "F.O.B." sales. This is clearly contrary to the Tax 
Commission's order. (Record at page 57.) It is unquestioned that 
the Utah Tax Commission may not impose a sales tax on the sale of 
tangible personal property by a seller located within Utah to a 
purchaser located outside Utah when the delivery—the taxable 
event—occurs outside Utah. EVCO v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (per 
curium); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). As a 
matter of law, any F.O.B. sales included in the assessed deficiency 
and taxed by the Audit Division must be refunded. 
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As conceded by the Audit Division at the hearing, if 
CBI is a manufacturer, its purchases of steel plate and other raw 
materials are exempt from Utah sales and use taxes. (Transcript 
at p. 62.) The uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing 
and case law that specifically analyzes CBI and its business 
activities establish that CBI is a manufacturer of personal 
property, not a real property contractor. As a manufacturer of 
personal property, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g), CBI 
was exempt from Utah sales and use taxes on purchases of steel 
plate and other raw materials that became component parts of the 
tanks it manufactured at the Salt Lake facility. 
B. CBI'S PURCHASES OF STEEL PLATE AND OTHER RAW 
MATERIALS ARE EXEMPT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 59-16-4(g) 
The Audit Division argues that CBI failed to show at 
the hearing that it was a "manufacturer" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-16-4(g). The Audit Division's assertion 
could hardly be more wrong. The only evidence presented at the 
hearing was that CBI was a manufacturer; the Audit Division did 
not present a single piece of evidence to the contrary. 
On direct examination, Mr. Leonard Christofferson, the 
plant manager of the Salt Lake facility during the period in 
question, testified as followsi 
[Question.] All right. Now, given the facility 
that you've described and the equipment that at least 
in part you have described at the facility, let's 
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discuss, if you can, a typical job that you did during 
this time. Let's—let's set aside for a minute the 
Golden Gate job; but describe for me at the facility 
how, generally, your operation out there would 
undertake and perform a job, and what did you do? Just 
tell us what you did. 
[Answer.] Okay. If we were—if the job happened 
to be, for example, a very plain, basic steel water 
tank, for example, we—we've all seen tanks around 
refineries, just the big vertical shell, cylindrical 
shells on it, we would bring those plates in 
individually and oxe-acetelyne burning—burn them to be 
a perfectly rectangular shape, and by that, I mean 
within tolerances, it would probably be within a 32nd 
of an inch of true dimension. And size all of the 
plates that go into the tank wall, and then we would 
pass them through a roll-forming operation to put the 
correct curvature in the plates. And that would be the 
total manufacturing of those components. 
Now, the tank bottom would be a—a question of 
moving the plates in and oxe-acetelyne burning the 
plates in a—in a kind of like a jigsaw puzzle, so that 
when you put it all together you have a large circle 
for the tank bottom, and so they would all be laid out 
with patterns and so forth, and again, oxe-acetelyne 
burning them, and assuming they don't paint—I'm making 
this relatively brief. 
For the roof of the tank, you would typically 
fabricate some structural steel members, such as 
channels that would be put up like rafters on a home, 
for example, the radial in the tank, supported by 
columns and then so that would involve cutting the 
rafters, drilling holes to bolt it to the—to the wall 
of the tank and bolt it up in the center, and also 
cutting a lot of little small pieces for gusset plates 
to bolt to support all this framing, and then you would 
perform the operations for roof plates the same as the 
bottom. It would be something that when put together, 
assembled at the site, would make up a big circle and 
set on top of it.• 
(Transcript at pages 21-22.) 
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[Question,] What kind of products did you make 
out there, other than tanks? 
[Answer.] Well, during the time period in 
question, we—we fabricated some spherical pressure 
vessels, and these were quite large, I don't remember 
the exact dimensions, but they would be in the vicinity 
of 50 feet in diameter fully—fully assembled. We 
manufactured all of the roadway deck components for the 
Golden Gate Bridge rehabilitation project. We 
manufactured components for a wind tunnel at Langly 
Field, Virginia. We manufactured what is known as a 
ying-yang, which is a very large, very massive piece of 
stainless steel. It's—it's actually a magnet case 
that was erected at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories 
in California for fusion-type research. Now, I—I 
don't know exactly how they use it for all of that, but 
it was a very unique—unique item and we typically did 
in addition to our tank work, our tank and pressure 
vessel work was always a common product line for years, 
but in addition, we nearly always had some of these 
unique jobs, one-of-a-kind type jobs in our plant at 
the same time, such as the bridge, the ying-yang, the 
wind tunnel, you don't repeat these jobs very often, 
maybe once every ten or 15 years, but somehow, there's 
always some around and we always seem to have some. 
I think the period of question, those are probably 
the significant jobs we did. 
(Transcript at page 24.) 
(Mr. Christofferson then illustrated with photographs 
each of the types of items manufactured at the Salt Lake 
facility. Those photographs and a video tape about the Golden 
Gate Bridge project are in Envelopes A and B attached to the 
Record.) 
[Question.] And from an engineering and 
manufacturing standpoint, is there any difference 
between manufacturing a large pressure vessel, for 
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instance, or a hot water tank that you're going to put 
in somebody's house? 
[Answer.] Okay. A hot water tank in a house is 
actually a pressure vessel because it—it—it stores 
water under whatever line pressure your house has, and 
if you open a valve on top, it'll shoot it up, so it's 
not atmospheric storage. It is in fact a pressure 
vessel. But the only real difference between that 
pressure vessel and a large propane pressure vessel 
that, say, is 50 feet in diameter, is the equipment 
that it takes to build it. It takes larger, heavier 
equipment and—but the basic designs are really not any 
different. Pressure is pressure, and it's retained by 
certain—there's certain engineering principles for 
designing pressure retaining parts, and whether they're 
small or large, the principles don't change, but the 
complexity of actually doing the work does change, 
because the large ones are made up of many, many pieces 
that have to be accurately manufactured, they have to 
fit very perfectly, to make up these large sections, 
there's very little room for error, and the steel gets 
thicker and thicker, the larger in diameter it gets, it 
becomes very thick, might be an inch-and-a-half or two 
inches thick or something like that. And—and so, it's 
really basically, the bigger they get, the tougher they 
get to build, but the real principles of what has to 
happen don't change. 
(Transcript at page 28.) 
[Question.] Now, does your facility and your 
group here have any role in the con—in the direction 
and assembly that's done in another state? 
[Answer.] None whatsoever. 
(Transcript at pages 30-31.) 
[Question.] Now, have there ever been instances 
in which, let's say, a tank has been sent to a site, 
assembled and erected, and then later torn down and 
shipped to someplace else? 
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[Answer.] Oh, yeah, there's been tanks erected at 
sites and then torn down and shipped to other places. 
We—we in the manufacturing had nothing to do with them 
when they were, we didn't do anything with them. 
[Question.] But it does happen? 
[Answer.] It occasionally happens, that someone 
will want a tank moved and someone will go move it. 
It's not very common, but it—I—in all honesty, it has 
happened, so the answer is really yes. 
(Transcript at page 45.) 
On examination by Commissioner Hansen, Mr. Christofferson further 
testified: 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Now, you indicated, I 
believe at one time a comment was made that 
transportation limitations is the only reason that 
components were not assembled at the plant. Picturing 
what I call a small tank, 12 feet diameter, 12 feet 
high, would that be assembled at the plant here in Salt 
Lake? 
THE WITNESS: It would depend on the shipping 
destination. I would say that 12 feet, you may be able 
to ship it to quite a number of places, perhaps not 
everywhere, but depending on where it needed to go. 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: But if you could, you would? 
THE WITNESS: Sure. If you could, you'd 
manufacture the entire tank, you would. 
(Transcript at page 40.) 
The Audit Division presented no evidence to rebut the 
evidence presented by CBI at the hearing that the only activities 
of CBI at its Salt Lake facility were manufacturing items of 
personal property, including tanks, pressure vessels and other 
items of personal property. Transporting the subassembled tanks 
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to the customer's place of business and assembling the tanks for 
the customer were necessary activities in selling very large 
tanks. The Audit Division mistakenly believes the inverse to be 
true—manufacturing tanks is incidental to transporting and 
assembling tanks. 
C. THE AUDIT DIVISION'S POSITION WILL SUBJECT CBI TO 
DOUBLE TAXATION 
The Audit Division alleges that its position will not 
subject CBI to double taxation and is not internally 
inconsistent. To this end, the Audit Division incorrectly states 
that the issue in the Chicago Bridge & Iron case was whether a 
use tax constituted an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce. The question of the constitutionality of state use 
taxes had already been resolved prior to the Chicago Bridge & 
Iron case. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 
U.S. 33 (1940); see also Chicago Bridge & Iron, 119 P.2d at 949-
952, and cases cited therein. The issue of whether the 
California use tax met constitutional muster was, therefore, 
ancillary to the primary issue in the case. Indeed, the first 
sentence of the Chicago Bridge and Iron case states plainly: 
The controversy presented by this appeal involves the 
liability of [CBI] for the payment of use tax levied 
under the California Use Tax Act of 1935. 
119 P.2d at 946. 
The California Supreme Court further stated: 
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It cannot be doubted that those materials that were 
purchased by [CBI] to fabricate tanks specifically to 
fulfill contracts or orders for tanks in California, 
were purchased for use, storage or other consumption in 
[California]. 
Id. at 948. Based on the exact facts at issue in the present 
case, the California Supreme Court held that CBI was liable for 
California use tax on all "materials . . . purchased for use in 
California . . . .H Xd. at 949. 
The Audit Division also cites Article V of the 
Multistate Tax Compact (the "Compact") as authority for its 
position that sales and use tax must be paid to Utah, rather than 
California. When viewed in light of the facts in this case, the 
Compact does not support this proposition. 
Article V of the Compact (codified at Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-22-1 (1953), currently Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-801 (1987)) 
states: 
Each purchaser liable for the use tax on tangible 
personal property shall be entitled to full credit for 
the combined amount or amounts of legally imposed sales 
or use taxes paid by him with respect to the same 
property to another state and any subdivision thereof, 
(emphasis added.) 
The overriding condition for allowing a credit under the Compact 
is, of course, that the sales or use tax must be legally imposed 
by the other state. 
The California Supreme Court has ruled that CBI is 
liable for California use tax on purchases of steel plate and 
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other raw materials that become component parts of property used 
in California, and CBI has already self-assessed and paid use tax 
to California on the purchases of raw materials for such 
products. The taxes payable on these purchases are not legally 
payable to Utah. 
Utah's imposition of a sales or use tax on purchases of 
steel plate and other raw materials that are specifically made to 
fulfill orders for tanks and other manufactured products to be 
delivered in California and to be assembled in California, 
exceeds the constitutional restrictions imposed on Utah's power 
to levy sales and use taxes. The foundational case on this issue 
is Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). In 
Complete Auto, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four 
part test for analyzing taxes that purportedly violate the 
Commerce Clause. In order to sustain a tax, a state must show 
that "[1] the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial 
nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does 
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly 
related to the services provided by the State." .Id., at 279. The 
tax in question fails the first and fourth parts of the Complete 
Auto test. 
As applied to sales and use taxes, the Complete Auto 
analysis views a sales or use tax as a one-time "property tax" 
imposed on the future use of the property in the taxing state. 
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There is no question that CBI should pay a property tax to Utah 
on the ownership of the real and personal property that comprised 
the Salt Lake facility. Utah clearly had sufficient nexus with 
and provided the kinds of police and other state protections to 
the property and equipment at the Salt Lake facility that justify 
compensation to Utah by CBI. During the period in question, CBI 
paid real and personal property taxes on the Salt Lake facility. 
However, Utah had insufficient nexus with the tanks 
that were manufactured at the Salt Lake facility for CBI 
customers in California and that were shipped to and assembled in 
California, and Utah provided no state services incident to the 
use of such tanks in California. California, on the other hand, 
did, and California continues to provide such state protections 
incident to the use of such tanks. 
Utah has already been compensated for its state 
protection of the manufacturing facility through CBI's payment of 
real and personal property taxes. Utah should not also be paid 
the "transaction property tax" on the personal property 
manufactured at the Salt Lake facility where Utah has no nexus 
with and provides no ongoing protection to such manufactured 
property, and where another state, such as California, does 
provide such protection. The imposition of a sales or use tax on 
the purchases at issue in this case fails the test set forth in 
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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Finally, the Audit Division completely misconstrues the 
purpose of the enactment of Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(33). That 
section was not enacted to give some special benefit to real 
property contractors. The section simply recognizes that the 
federal Commerce Clause limitations analyzed in Complete Auto 
prohibit Utah from taxing such extraterritorial activities. 
D. CBI DID NOT INTENTIONALLY DISREGARD LAW 
The Audit Division asserts that because CBI disagreed 
with the position of the Audit Division on liability for sales or 
use tax, CBI intentionally disregarded law. Apparently, the 
Audit Division believes that any announced position of the Audit 
Division constitutes established law, notwithstanding contrary 
statutory or case authority. The Audit Division is wrong. 
The Audit Division cites a February 29, 1984 letter 
from Donald R. Bosch, Director of the Auditing Division (Record 
at pages 98-99), as the sole authority for its assertion that CBI 
intentionally disregarded the law. However, the Audit Division 
admits that the letter merely *outlin[ed] its position." 
(Respondent's brief at page 22.) (emphasis added.) The February 
29, 1984 letter amounted to nothing more than a restatement of 
the Audit Division's position—it did not constitute established 
statutory law or case law. 
Although apparently there is no state law on point, for 
federal income tax purposes, it is well established that the 
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positions of administrative agencies and their employees do not 
have the force of law. Even a published determination of the 
Internal Revenue Service (such as a private letter ruling or a 
and revenue ruling) does not constitute established law or rule. 
To this end, the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") provides: 
"Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes by 
regulations, a written determination may not be cited 
or used as precedent." 
I.R.C. § 6110. See also Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates, Inc. v. 
United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1971) ("A [revenue 
ruling] is merely the opinion of a lawyer in the agency and must 
be accepted as such. . . . As such, it has no more binding or 
legal force than the opinion of any other lawyer."). See also 
Foil v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1990); CWT Farms, 
Inc. and CWT International, Inc. v. Commissioner, 755 F.2d 790 
(11th Cir. 1985); Schneier v. Commissioner, 735 F.2d 375 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
Because the Audit Division's letter constituted nothing 
more than the position of the Audit Division, CBI had every right 
to disagree with the Audit Division's position, particularly in 
light of the fact that Utah statutory and case law did not 
support the Audit Division's position, and California statutory 
and case law were directly contrary to the Audit Division's 
position. 
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The Audit Division admits that the very issues at stake 
in this case had previously been resolved in CBI's favor. 
(Transcript at page 70.) Further, contrary to the assertion of 
the Audit Division, at no time prior to or after the Audit 
Division's letter of February 29, 1984 did CBI ever agree to pay 
sales or use taxes to Utah in the future as a condition of 
resolving in CBI's favor past alleged deficiencies. (Transcript 
at page 74.) 
As the Audit Division itself admits, the February 29, 
1984 letter "evidences a long standing disagreement between the 
Auditing Division and Petitioner regarding Utah sales tax." 
(Transcript at page 24.) The letter evidences a disagreement— 
and nothing more. That disagreement existed after the letter, 
and still exists. 
The Audit Division introduced no evidence at the 
hearing that CBI intentionally disregarded any established law. 
Indeed, the only evidence of established law introduced at the 
hearing was introduced by CBI. In Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. 
Johnson, the California Supreme Court ordered CBI to pay use tax 
to California on the very kind of purchases at issue in this 
case. Had CBI ignored the order of the California Supreme Court 
it would, indeed, have been guilty of "intentional disregard of 
law or rule." Where the only established law or rule required 
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CBI to pay use taxes to California, as a matter of law, CBI 
cannot be found to have intentionally disregarded law or rule. 
The Audit Division also completely ignores the 
authority cited by CBI that illustrates that CBI is not even 
liable for simple negligence, much less "intentional disregard of 
law." The cases cited at pages 18 through 20 of CBI's Brief of 
Appellant demonstrate the standard for simple negligence adopted 
by both federal and state courts. Contrary to the Audit 
Division's assertion that the cases construing Section 6651(a) 
are not applicable in the instant case because Section 6651(a) 
deals with a taxpayer's failure to file, the "reasonable cause" 
standard set forth in Section 6651(a) is indeed the standard used 
by both federal and state courts in determining whether a 
taxpayer was negligent in not paying taxes which arguably were 
due, as well as determining whether a taxpayer was negligent in 
failing to file a return. See cases at CBI's Brief of Appellant, 
pages 18-20. Those cases illustrate that CBI was not negligent. 
Under Utah law, the Tax Commission cannot access 
penalties unless the taxpayer was at least negligent. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-401(3) (Supp. 1991). See also Robert H. Hinckley v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 404 P.2d 662, 669 (Utah 1965). Where CBI 
cannot be liable for ordinary "negligence", and thus liable for a 
10% penalty under Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-401(3)(a), as a matter of 
law, it cannot be liable for "intentional disregard of law or 
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rule", and thus liable for a 15% penalty under Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-l-401(3)(b). 
The Audit Division presented no evidence that CBI 
intentionally disregarded any established law or rule. There is 
no evidence that CBI was negligent or intentionally disregarded 
any established law or rule. As a result, there are no facts 
that would support the imposition of penalties against CBI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, CBI respectfully requests 
that the ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission be reversed and 
that CBI be given the following relief: 
1. The imposition of sales or use tax by the Utah 
State Tax Commission with respect to the purchase of steel plate 
and other raw materials that were manufactured into tanks, 
pressure vessels, and other structures that were then shipped and 
assembled outside the State of Utah should be reversed. 
2. The case should be remanded to the Utah State Tax 
Commission with instructions to refund the taxes, penalties, and 
interest previously paid by CBI. 
3. If sales or use tax is determined to be payable on 
such purchases, the penalties imposed by the Utah State Tax 
Commission on any sales or use tax deficiencies should be 
reversed, and the case should be remanded to the Utah State Tax 
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Commission with instructions to refund such penalties, together 
with the interest on such penalties, previously paid by CBI. 
DATED this /3 day of December, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By: 
Robert A. Peters* 
Ronald G. Moffitt 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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